Posted On: September 10, 2007 by Romanucci & Blandin

Illinois Appellate Court upholds $18M verdict in Chicago police department chase

The Illinois 1st District Appellate Court on Friday affirmed a $17.68 million verdict in favor of Romanucci & Blandin client, Vernon Hudson, who was left paralyzed when his vehicle was struck by a Chicago police car involved in a chase of a homicide suspect.

chicago%20police.jpgHudson was on his way home from his job as a truck mechanic at the time of the May 2001 collision on the Eisenhower Expressway. He sued the city and Officer Sung Joo Lee, who later was dismissed from the suit. Hudson brought both negligence and willful and wanton conduct counts against the city.

A Cook County jury ruled in favor of Hudson on both counts after a March 2005 trial before Cook County Circuit Judge Irwin J. Solganick. Solganick denied the city's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.

Among the city's arguments on appeal was that it was immune against the negligence count pursuant to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. The city also argued that Lee's conduct was not willful and wanton.

Accounts of the accident given at trial varied, according to the appeals court. Hudson testified that he entered the westbound Eisenhower Expressway at Damen Avenue and was in the right lane near Kedzie Avenue when he heard police sirens and pulled over to the right shoulder. Hudson said his car was nearly all the way on the shoulder when it was hit.

Lee, meanwhile, testified that she and her partner went to the area of the pursuit to help other officers. Lee said she was driving about 45 mph and had just moved into the right lane from the adjacent one when she saw Hudson's car pulling out in front of her from the shoulder. Lee said she had not been looking at the shoulder and did not see Hudson's car prior to the crash.

Witness Denise Patrick described Lee's squad car as ''jumping'' across four lanes of traffic before hitting Hudson's vehicle as he tried to move to the shoulder.

In describing her role in the chase, Lee said she believed she might be able to help with traffic control or assist in apprehending the suspect if he were armed or fled the scene.

Lee explicitly and repeatedly denied that she was actively involved in the chase.

As for the negligence count, the city argued that sections 2-202 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act shielded it. Section 2-202 provides, ''A public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.''

Section 2-109 states, ''A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.''

According to the court, the city argued that Lee was enforcing or executing the law at the time of the accident and was not acting willfully or wantonly, so it should be immune from liability.

Section 2-202 immunity does not extend to all police activities, but only to acts while in the actual execution or enforcement of a law, Justice Joseph Gordon wrote for the three-judge panel.

Under Arnolt v. City of Highland Park, 52 Ill.2d 27, 33 (1972), the question of whether a police officer is executing or enforcing the law is a factual determination made in light of all the circumstances involved, Gordon wrote. The appeals court reviewed several cases in determining whether immunity should apply in Lee's situation.

Gordon wrote that if Lee had been providing traffic control at the time of the accident or even on her way to provide traffic control, section 2-202 immunity would apply. Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill.2d 211, 221 (1986), and Morris v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill.App.3d 740.

Immunity also would have applied in other circumstances, such as if the lead officers on the chase had requested backup ''due to the suspect taking a hostage or shooting at the police,'' he said. Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill.App.3d 356, 361 (1999).

''Finally, there can be no dispute that had Officer Lee been attempting to apprehend the suspect with the permission of her supervisors, she would have been immune from negligence under section 2-202,'' Gordon wrote.

But in this case, the court found, the jury was free to conclude that none of those scenarios applied because none of the officers involved the chase requested backup.

''The only law that was in actual need of enforcement related to the apprehension of a criminal suspect, and Officer Lee explicitly denied that she was taking part in that enforcement,'' Gordon wrote. ''Thus, the jury could have concluded that Officer Lee was not involved in enforcing or executing the law, but was merely making herself available to enforce or execute the law should the need arise.''

The appeals court also rejected the city's argument that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to make a finding of willful and wanton conduct. The panel disagreed with the contention that Hudson's use of a computer simulation of the accident as evidence was improper. Further, citing Patrick's testimony and even Lee's own description of the accident, the appeals court found that even without the simulation, the jury still could have concluded that Lee acted willfully and wantonly.

The case is Vernon Hudson v. City of Chicago, etc., No. 1-05-2822.

Hudson was represented by Michael W. Rathsack, Stephan D. Blandin and Antonio M. Romanucci. Rathsack said that while the opinion is fact-specific, it does clarify that in police chases cases, the court should look at the entire circumstances of the case before deciding whether immunity applies. Romanucci and Blandin said their client was pleased with the ruling.

''It was not a close case,'' Blandin said.